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Abstract 
This thesis found its point of departure in the conundrum of why people join environmental 
organizations. To find what factors can predict membership in environmental organizations is 
becoming increasingly important as climate change worsens, and collective action seems out of 
reach. The value-belief-norm theory argues that when individuals harbor the right values, 
beliefs and norms, proenvironmental behavior will ensue and thus alleviate collective action 
problems. To some extent, this has been shown to be the case. The literature has failed, however, 
in explaining costly proenvironmental behavior. This thesis furthers the research agenda by 
investigating whether reputation can add explanatory power to the VBN theory, through a 
tentative quantitative analysis of World Values Survey data. Reputation has long been seen as 
a facilitator of cooperation and could potentially explain why some individuals join 
environmental organization or not. The hypotheses tested are 1) Individuals with a strong 
personal norm will be more likely to join an organization; 2) That an individual that accords a 
high reputation to the environmental movement will be more likely to join an organization; 3) 
That an egoistic individual will be as likely as an altruistic individual, or more likely, to join an 
organization. Through conducting several logistic regressions this thesis finds support for all of 
the hypotheses. Future research would benefit from replicating the results found in this thesis. 
Furthermore, future research should focus on disaggregating the “environmental movement” 
and study membership in relation to specific organizations whether local or national, big or 
small.  
Keywords: Environmental organization; Proenvironmental behavior; VBN theory; 
Reputation; Collective action 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental organizations are important players, channeling public opinion, putting pressure 
on politicians and generally trying to affect policy decisions. In Sweden, the SSFNC (Swedish 
Society for Nature Conservation) is the largest NGO, but – why do people join such 
organizations, how can that be explained?  
Determining which factors influence pro-environmental, or pro-social behavior in general, is 
highly important in order to successfully create policies for combating a range of contemporary 
collective action problems such as e.g. climate change, resource depletion or pollution (Harring, 
Jagers & Matti, 2017). Whilst exploring previous literature this thesis finds that while the 
research conducted provides extensive answers, it does not quite fill in all the blanks. The 
variance explained by the literature in proenvironmental behavior ranges from between 20 
percent to 50 percent. There has been success in finding determinants for less costly behavior, 
but still, explanatory power is still lacking when it comes to costlier behaviors (Jagers et al, 
2017). This thesis proposes the idea, following Ostrom’s (1998) example in relation to 
collective action, that the introduction of indirect reciprocity, inferred through reputation, to the 
value-belief-norm theory of proenvironmental behavior (henceforth VBN theory) would paint 
a more complete picture of how e.g. policies, organizations and social movements gain support 
and acceptance. In this thesis this relationship will be tested by analyzing World Value Survey 
(WVS) data.  
Research concerning what factors determine voluntary proenvironmental behavior is mainly 
found in the field of environmental psychology (Harring & Jagers, 2013). There are general 
directions of research within this field; first the value-basis of environmental beliefs and 
behavior, second the role of environmental concern and the third strand of research concern 
itself with the role of moral obligation to act pro-environmentally (Steg & Vlek, 2009). In this 
thesis the primary concern is the third line of research, although there are lessons to be learned 
from the other directions as well. The first line of research has found e.g. that people who are 
more pro-social, altruistic and self-transcendent are more likely to be more actively pro-
environmental. The second strand of research has found that the more environmental concern 
an individual harbor, the more prone the individual is to engage in pro-environmental behavior 
(Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
As I stated above the third general line of research concerns the moral obligation to act pro-
environmentally. Studies conducted within this research usually set out from the norm 
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activation model, the planned behavior theory or, as in the case of this thesis, the VBN theory. 
By using these points of departure this line of research has been able to explain some forms of 
pro-environmental behavior. These behaviors include e.g. policy acceptance and political 
behavior e.g. signing petitions, demonstrating or contacting representatives (Steg & Vlek, 2009, 
Harring & Jagers, 2013). However, the theory falls short of explaining behaviors that are 
associated with higher personal costs in relation to time, money and effort e.g. restricting one’s 
car use or being a member in an organization. Also, in line with this, the theory has been shown 
to be able to better explain individuals’ acceptance of governmental policies in the form of 
“pull”-instruments rather than “push”-instruments i.e. it can explain support for instruments 
that are aimed at incentivizing rather than punishing (Jagers et al, 2017, Jagers et al, 2018, 
Eriksson et al, 2008). This does not mean that the theory is lacking the potential to explain 
costlier behaviors; it simply suggests that something is missing from the equation. Values, 
beliefs and norms only take one so far.  
In line with this thought, a lot of authors have tried to include other explanatory factors and 
determinants in an effort to expand the VBN theory, spanning from attempts to include e.g. 
individual motivation (Steg et al, 2005), to political and interpersonal trust (Harring & Jagers, 
2013) to motivations (Jagers et al, 2016). Harring and Jagers (2013), showed that political and 
interpersonal trust affects the extent to which people are willing to accept environmental policy, 
in their case operationalized as carbon dioxide tax. In other words, if an individual trust that 
their fairly elected politicians knows what is required to combat climate change and that they 
will utilize tax revenue in an effective way while also trusting their fellow citizens to cooperate, 
the individual will be more prone to accept environmental policy. At least at a low cost to 
oneself. Similarly, Jagers et al (2016) explored whether individual motivations lead to what 
they call environmentally significant behavior (ESB). They judge that individuals have 
different motivations for acting proenvironmentally e.g. some people act environmentally 
because they want to be conscientious about the environment, while others may act 
environmentally because of potential outcomes of the behavior itself e.g. economic or health 
outcomes (Jagers et al, 2018).  
However, although including trust in the VBN theory makes the theory able to explain pro-
environmental behavior to a greater degree, it still falls short of the mark when it comes to 
explaining how costlier behavior can take place. I think part of the answer to that particular 
conundrum lies in the importance of a, normatively, good reputation. The costlier an endeavor 
is to the individual; the more important prior knowledge of an organization or social movement 
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becomes i.e. their reputation. In this thesis I will explore and try to explain the role of reputation 
might have in the support for social movements, specified in this thesis as membership in 
environmental organizations. 
Thus, it is the past behavior of an organization or social movement that comes to the fore. This 
past behavior is used by individuals as a predictor of future behavior (Bitektine, 2011). In this 
thesis I argue that even if an individual harbor the correct values, beliefs and norms that 
individual will not engage in costly behavior, e.g. membership in an organization, if the 
organization or social movement at hand does not have a good reputation.  It has been shown 
in previous research that reputation levels extend to trust i.e. a bad reputation leads to less trust 
from your peers, and vice versa (Barclay 2004). In large scale collective action (LSCA), where 
cooperation is hard to enforce due to the large number of people making it hard to hold defectors 
accountable, a good reputation becomes a receipt of past good behavior and cooperation, thus 
signaling to others that one is trustworthy. In other words, in relation to LSCA where faces 
change, one needs another guarantee e.g. a reputable name (Milinski, 2016). As such, the aim 
of this thesis is to investigate if the inclusion of reputation in the VBN-theory can explain 
costlier pro-environmental behavior. 
As stated above, this thesis will examine the discussion on what determinants there are for pro-
environmental behavior, in general, but will also conduct a tentative theory developing analysis 
to evaluate if reputation potentially lends the VBN model more explanatory power in relation 
to costlier pro-environmental behaviors. The rest of the paper is structured as follows; first I 
will describe the research gap and contribution of this thesis. Next, I will account for the 
theoretical background of the VBN model, Reputation and how the two fits together. In the 
third part I will present my methodology, data and the limitations of the research. Fourth I will 
present the results of my analysis and discuss this in relation to my hypotheses. Finally, I will 
discuss my results and suggest future avenues of research. 
1.1. Contribution of the thesis and research gap 
“… [T]he theory of collective action is the central subject of 
political science. It is the core of the justification of the state.” 
(Ostrom, 1998, p 1) 
As Ostrom states, research surrounding collective action is at the very center of political 
science. History is a story of fierce competition and conflict that ranges from fighting over 
natural resources to expanding the borders of the state. And yet, despite this, we can see 
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evidence of cooperation everywhere.  The social contract between the state and its citizens, 
compliance with rules and regulation and trade between nation-states are but a few examples 
of collective action. Nowak (2006), in reference to the fact that no other living organism is 
engaged in the same complex struggle concerning cooperation and defection, claims that 
“[h]umans are the champions of cooperation” (Nowak, 2006, p 1560). Humans have a singular 
ability to overcome the problems inherent to collective action.  
There are plenty of examples where humans fail to solve collective action problems, but perhaps 
the most prominent is the issue of climate change. The environment is a global common which 
means that negative events, e.g. pollution, ultimately affects everyone. Environmental problems 
such as the depletion of fish stocks, degradation of air quality and global warming are situations 
where the long-term consequences of doing nothing or too little will have catastrophic 
consequences, yet we fail to find solutions that people are willing to adhere to (Harring & 
Jagers, 2013). In general people are more prone to do what benefits themselves individually in 
the short-term, thus disregarding future collective losses if this has costly consequences for 
themselves. In LSCA this phenomenon becomes even more prevalent since the collective 
usually does not have any way to ensure accountability between all individuals. The ways to 
ensure accountability in small scale collective action are not feasible when the number of people 
involved becomes greater. Face-to-face communication and direct reciprocity simply are not 
feasible in LSCA which increases the opportunities for individuals to defect (Ostrom, 2010, 
Duit, 2010).  
There is a plethora of suggestions of how to facilitate cooperation in the research surrounding 
collective action. For example, there are those who propagate the view that deliberative 
democracy is the foremost way to combat environmental issues, there are also those that 
research ways to influence peoples’ pro-environmental values and behavior through different 
various policies. In economic research most researchers advance the argument that market-
based solutions are what have the highest chance of alleviating the collective action problems 
inherent to environmental issues (Harring & Jagers, 2013).   
However, what success various policy measures enjoy is immaterial if they do not gain 
acceptance and support from the general population. Thus, the focus of this thesis is on factors 
that can explain support and acceptance of organizations, policies and movements, in general, 
and what can explain costly behavior, e.g. membership in an environmental organization, in 
particular. A lot of research has been conducted on this topic already, and it has been able to 
partially explain, relatively, cheap pro-environmental behavior. However, costlier pro-social 
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and pro-environmental behavior has yet to be fully understood. Costlier behavior is 
characterized by instances where e.g. an individual has to be willing to sacrifice more time, 
money and effort. This is indeed problematic since as Ostrom (2010) states, that in order to 
combat climate change, it is required that “many participants take expensive actions” (Ostrom, 
2010: 550). One such behavior that Ostrom (2010) speaks of, and the behavior intended for 
analysis in this thesis, is membership in an, environmental, organization. Being a member in an 
environmental organization, in most cases, has costly consequences in relation to time, money 
and effort (Jagers et al, 2016, Jagers et al, 2018, Stern et al, 1999). Harring and Jagers (2013) 
raise the question that if value research is right, i.e. that what you need is the correct values, 
which leads to a certain behavior, then why are there “grey” individuals? “Grey” individuals 
are conceptualized as individuals who have all the right prerequisites but do not act accordingly 
(Harring & Jagers, 2013: 213-214). Furthermore, Tam and Chan (2018) states that there is 
“dearth of investigations” in relation to what they call the “concern-behavior” gap i.e. the gap 
between high levels of environmental concern and actual proenvironmental behavior (Tam & 
Chan, 2018: 183).   
This thesis, in an effort to add to literature concerning these “grey” individuals and the 
“concern-behavior” gap, explores the possibility that indirect reciprocity, inferred through 
reputation, might explain why some individuals engage in costly behavior while others do not. 
To the author’s knowledge no research has been conducted to explore the potential role of 
reputation in the VBN-theory, or otherwise. The main contribution of this thesis is that it will 
address this research gap and add to the field of research. Furthermore, it will lend further 
understanding to the literature of how to overcome collective action problems in relation to 
costly behavior.  
Additionally, as the vast majority of previous research has been conducted on pro-
environmental behavior in general, without paying special attention to specific behavior, this 
thesis will make a contribution with an analysis of a specific costly behavior, namely; 
membership in an environmental organization.  
1.2. Purpose and aim 
As mentioned above the suggested research gap this thesis intends to fill pertains to the 
determinants of costly proenvironmental behavior. Focus will be on the role of reputation in 
relation to the VBN theory of support for social movements when it comes to membership in 
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an environmental behavior. To fulfill the aim of this thesis, an analysis of WVS data will be 
conducted. The following overarching question will be answered: 
Can the inclusion of reputation in the VBN-theory of support for social movements explain 
costly proenvironmental behavior? 
2. Theoretical framework and literature review 
The determinants of proenvironmental behavior have been amply studied in past research.  Yet 
there has, to the author’s knowledge, not been any successful attempt of explaining why some 
individuals engage in costly behavior and others do not. I have chosen to focus on the arguments 
put forward in the research concerning the moral obligation to act proenvironmentally. In the 
following sections I account for the VBN theory of support for social movements, as well as 
the existing critiques of it. Additionally, I also present a review of the research on reputation 
and how it facilitates collective action through reciprocity, both direct and indirect. Finally I 
present my arguments for why reputation should facilitate costly proenvironmental behavior 
and thus be a plausible addition to the VBN theory.  
2.1. Environmental behavior explained by values, beliefs and norms 
The VBN theory has been developed in the last couple of decades within the field of 
environmental psychology. It holds that proenvironmental and prosocial behavior has its roots 
in peoples’ personal values. In other words, peoples’ normative ideals concerning how the 
world should be; guide their actions. The theory posits that values held by an individual are part 
of a causal chain where values leads to beliefs about how the world should work i.e. an 
awareness of the consequences attached to one’s actions or inaction and an ascription of 
responsibility for these actions or inaction. These beliefs in turn lead to the individual 
developing personal norms of how to act (Stern et al, 1999, Stern, 2000). The VBN theory is a 
hierarchical model, where each variable is mediated through the next i.e. values are mediated 
by beliefs which in turn are mediated through a personal norm (Harring & Jagers, 2013).  
The inventors of the VBN theory drew inspiration from a few different prior theories when 
creating it, basically one for each step in the model. The general value orientation of an 
individual is assessed by using a condensed version of Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) value inventory 
scale. The original version outlined by Schwartz measured two dimensions; openness to change 
and self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement. Self-transcendence includes values such as 
altruism, universalism and benevolence while self-enhancement includes value types such as 
power, achievement and self-interest (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). In Stern et al’s (1999) version 
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only the second dimension of self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence is included. In a later 
version the value dimension of the VBN theory has been further developed to only specify 
altruistic, egoistic and biospheric values (Stern, 2000). Unsurprisingly the more altruistic the 
individual, the more prone to proenvironmental behavior the individual is. 
The second source of inspiration is the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), which is not so much 
a theory as it is a perspective. It is representative of individuals’ growing realization that one’s 
actions has far-reaching effects that can be harmful to the biosphere (Stern et al, 1999). In sum, 
it leads to an awareness of the consequences of one’s actions. This in turn leads to an ascription 
of responsibility of how one chooses to act regarding the values one holds, and the consequences 
of one’s action or inaction (Stern et al, 1999). In Stern et al’s (1999) study the primary focus is 
environmentalism, which lends itself well to NEP. Should one’s focus lie on a different social 
movement, e.g. the labor movement, one could potentially replace this variable with another 
perspective. Altruistic values would then lead to another pro-social worldview, giving rise to 
awareness of consequences particular to that struggle and ascription of responsibility for the 
consequences of action or inaction. 
The third inspiration is found in the Norm Activation Theory (NAT) (Stern et al, 1999). This 
theory posits that, given the right circumstances, personal norms held by individuals will be 
activated, which in turn leads to the individual acting in line with the norm. According to the 
theory norm activation occurs when an individual is aware of the consequences of one’s action 
or inaction and ascribes responsibility to oneself for those consequences (Stern et al, 1999). The 
VBN theory states that this activation of a personal norm leads to proenvironmental behavior. 
Research into proenvironmental behavior has shown that it is necessary to categorize different 
kinds of behavior. Stern (2000) found that pro-environmental behavior can be divided into three 
major distinct categories; environmental activism, non-activist behaviors in the public sphere 
and private-sphere environmentalism. Environmental activism mainly concerns joining 
environmental organizations and demonstrating. Public-sphere non-activism is characterized 
by e.g. signing petitions and supporting policy. Private-sphere environmentalism 
predominantly takes place in the everyday life of citizens e.g. recycling and buying local 
produce for environmental reasons. He also found four different factors that act as determinants 
for these behaviors; attitudinal, contextual, personal capabilities and habits and routines. 
Attitudinal factors signify values, beliefs and norms, with subsequent views on costs and 
benefits of specific actions. Contextual factors denote e.g. laws and regulations and material 
costs. Personal capabilities concern e.g. an individual’s formal education level or specific 
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knowledge about environmental matters. Habits and routines is quite self-explanatory and 
simply dentoes that an individual’s usual way of doing things will affect whether specific 
actions are, to a greater or lesser extent, feasible. These determinants can under the wrong 
circumstances act as constraints on individuals’ capacity to act pro-environmentally, and vice 
versa (Stern, 2000: 416-417)9.  
Stern (2000) further argues that each category of environmental behavior has different causes. 
Therefore, one should not assume that all environmental behaviors are caused, or affected, in 
the same way by the different determinants. For example, attitudinal factors should explain 
more of the variance in behaviors that are not constrained by contextual aspects or personal 
capabilities. Whilst costly or expensive behaviors, theoretically should be better explained by 
personal capabilities or contextual factors. In this thesis, the main focus is on attitudinal and 
contextual factors in the form of indirect reciprocity induced by organizational reputation 
(Stern, 2000: 418).  
These different sources of inspiration are all brought together in the VBN theory and create a 
causal chain. Values are mediated through one’s world view, which gives rise to an awareness 
of consequences and ascription of responsibility that in its turn activates one or several personal 
norms thus leading to pro-social behavior. It is a moral obligation stemming from the awareness 
of consequences and ascription of responsibility that activates the norm and subsequent 
behavior (Stern et al, 1999, Stern, 2000). There are, however, critics of the VBN theory that 
need to be voiced.  
2.2. Critique of the VBN theory of support of social movements 
Kaiser et al (2005) state that the theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is better equipped to explain 
pro-environmental behavior. While moral and altruistic norms play a key role in the VBN 
theory, in TPB they only play an implicit role. Kaiser et al (2005) also object to the VBN theory 
explaining behavior through the mediation of long line of variables. According to TPB intention 
is the direct antecedent of overt behavior. Intention is explained as being an individual’s 
perceived control, their attitude towards a certain act and their subjective norms. Attitude is 
further specified as the rational evaluation of consequences associated with a certain behavior, 
and subjective norms are described as the strength of normative beliefs and the motivation to 
act according to these beliefs (Kaiser et al, 2005). The authors test the two theories against each 
                                                          
9 Paragraph taken from course paper in the course Applied statistical analysis, SF2321, University of 
Gothenburg, 2017. (Karan N. 2018, Environmental Attitudes and Behavior) 
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other and find support for both, but further state that they believe TPB explains the relationship 
between intention and behavior more fully than the VBN theory. However, as Nordlund and 
Garvill (2002) state, this might be a consequence of the concepts of intention and behavior 
being closer, rather than the long causal chain of causality inherent to VBN. Nordlund and 
Garvill (2002) further argue that values as a concept are abstract and transcend situations, which 
could explain the rather weak relation found between general values and behavior.  
There is also a literature criticizing VBN for presupposing that proenvironmental behavior 
always stems from proenvironmental values, beliefs and norms (Steg & Vlek, 2009). These 
authors argue that proenvironmental behavior is “equifinal, (i.e. an outcome that can be reached 
by many potential means)” (Jagers et al, 2016, p 645). As such, they argue that not only 
prosocial, or proenvironmental, values can promote proenvironmental behavior. Instead, 
proenvironmental behavior is seen as something that it is possible for to stem from both 
personal aspirations as well as collective interests. It is also shown that the same motivational 
foundation, i.e. environmental values, beliefs and norms, can vary in its predictive power on 
the same proenvironmental behavior (Stern, 2000, Steg & Vlek, 2009). Jagers and colleagues 
(2016) show that respondents often state that their proenvironmental behavior is not motivated 
by proenvironmentalism at all, but state e.g. health or economic reasons instead (Jagers et al, 
2016: 652-653). This goes to show that one does not necessarily have to have proenvironmental 
values, beliefs and norm to act proenvironmentally. But rather that proenvironmental behavior 
can have “self-serving” motivations as well.  
However, since the aim of this paper is to include reputation in a model for explaining public 
support for social movements, moral and altruistic norms must be included. Reputation levels 
are affected by altruistic and moral actions as well as historical performance and inferred future 
behavior (Milinski et al, 2002a, Lange et al, 2005). This and the fact that the VBN theory has 
almost as much explanatory power as TPB, shows that the theory is still a valid choice, even 
though TPB potentially explains the relation between intention and behavior more fully. 
Furthermore, both De Groot and Steg (2009) and Steg and De Groot (2010) show that the norm 
activation model works as a mediator model. Behavior and intentions were found to be affected 
by level of problem awareness, ascription of responsibility and outcome efficacy. Nordlund and 
Garvill (2005) also find support for the mediator model, when testing whether personal values 
affect personal norms of behavior on 1400 individuals in Sweden. This lends further strength 
to the VBN model, showing that behavior depends on the level of awareness of consequences, 
awareness of responsibility and personal values. However, as stated above, the VBN theory 
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does have difficulties with painting a full picture of why people decide to act pro-
environmentally. Harring and Jagers (2013) included political and interpersonal trust in the 
VBN theory and succeeded in part. They found that people who have higher levels of trust are 
also more prone to act pro-environmentally i.e. more likely to comply with policy in the case 
of their study. But they could still not explain why people with all the right prerequisites do not 
engage in costlier behavior. 
Incorporating trust in the VBN theory did get results, but it still does not explain why some 
people act pro-environmentally and others do not. The individuals who have the correct values, 
are aware of the consequences of action or inaction and ascribe responsibility to themselves but 
still choose to not act are still a puzzle to the research field. This thesis tries to explain these 
“grey” individuals by adding the concept of reputation to the VBN-theory. However, before 
such an addition can be made it is important to have a discussion on how reputation is 
conceptualized in this thesis. 
2.3. Reputation and collective action 
Milinski (2016) describes reputation as a universal currency because of its social nature. Any 
prior information about the other part, i.e. the reputation of the other part, in a social transaction 
helps to make good decisions. Having a good reputation thus becomes paramount to be 
considered a trustworthy counterpart in a transaction. Reputation is even argued, by some 
authors, to help stabilize the tragedy of the commons (Semmann et al, 2005, Panchanathan & 
Boyd, 2004, Milinski et al, 2002b). A good, or bad, reputation is gained by mechanisms of 
either direct or indirect reciprocation. Direct reciprocation is characterized by tit-for-tat 
strategies, i.e. if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours. Direct reciprocity mandates that the 
same two individuals will repeatedly interact, which is not the case in LSCA. Since this version 
of reciprocation is quite immediate in nature and does not hinge upon prior knowledge, it will 
not be further analyzed in this paper. Indirect reciprocation however, requires at least two steps 
in contrast to the one step tit-for-tat strategies of direct reciprocation. Rather than “you scratch 
my back, I scratch yours” it is “I see you scratch someone else’s back, I scratch yours” 
(Milinski, 2016, Nowak & Sigmund, 2005, Nowak, 2006). Along those lines Nowak (2006) 
states that “[t]he money that fuels the engine of indirect reciprocity is reputation” (Nowak, 
2006, p 1561). 
Through indirect reciprocation one obtains a good reputation that helps in future transactions, 
if your behavior has been observed by others. Another way to describe it is that when direct 
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reciprocation is observed, it becomes indirect reciprocation when the observers reward that 
behavior in later transactions (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Observation not only works as a 
catalyst for indirect reciprocation, i.e. when the observers reward the contributor in a latter 
transaction, it also works as a catalyst for altruistic behavior. Haley and Fessler (2005) show 
that being observed, through putting eyes on the desktop of the computer during an experiment, 
raised individual’s propensity to act altruistically thus sustaining cooperation and ensuring 
prosocial behavior. They draw the conclusion that individuals not only observe overt and 
explicit signals and information when making judgments about others and engaging in certain 
behaviors but are influenced by much more implicit and subtle cues.  
In a similar vein Vonasch et al (2017) show that individuals will go to extreme lengths to 
preserve their reputation in a series of hypothetical experimental situations. When asked if they 
would e.g. endure intense pain rather than being known as a Nazi or child molester, most people 
chose to endure pain or even death (Vonasch, 2017: 7). The authors’ state that this is due to 
society is based on pro-social behavior and cooperation. To damage one’s reputation in this 
setting equals making one’s life that much harder to lead. The stimuli in their experiment are 
rather extreme albeit hypothetical, and their results should be taken with a grain of salt. Stimuli 
like these, however, are never perfectly calculated, but in general; researchers seem more 
forgiving of stimuli that say too much than stimuli that say nothing at all. 
Milinski et al (2002a) find that altruistic behavior is rewarded with more contributions from 
observers. In their experimental study they noticed that if a hypothetical politician was seen 
giving a contribution to UNICEF, they not only received more contributions themselves, but 
their political reputation was also enhanced. They note, however, that their results might have 
been different had they chosen to use a less known organization than UNICEF as the recipient 
(Milinski et al, 2002a, p 882-883). Nevertheless, Hardy and Van Nugt (2006) find similar 
results in an experimental study of their own. They show that altruism bestows more status to 
group members. Altruistic individuals were more respected, held in higher esteem and were 
more often put forward as group leaders.   
Furthermore, Semmann et al (2005) find that reputation is important not only within one’s own 
social group, but it carries over to other social contexts as well. A good reputation makes all 
your peers more prone to cooperate with you, given that they know of your prior behavior. In 
their experiment, they alternated participants between groups. Each participant had their 
transaction history on full display regardless of which group they played with. What they found 
was that contributors during public good games took no note of if the person they contributed 
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to had been in the same group during earlier indirect reciprocity games. Thus, they conclude 
that reputation carries over, if one is regarded as a good person one is rewarded with more 
contributions not only in one’s own social group. This could be because of individuals’ 
propensity to trust more altruistic people (Barclay, 2004). If people have a prior knowledge of 
a person’s past good behavior, this individual becomes more trustworthy in their eyes thus 
receiving more contributions. Rönnerstrand and Sundell (2015) in a study concerning 
reciprocity and trust, find that people are willing to postpone antibiotic treatment for a longer 
period of days, if they know that other people have postponed treatment. They deduce that this 
might be due to people’s desire for a good reputation and indirect reciprocity.  
2.4. Social judgments of organizational reputation 
So far, I have introduced how indirect reciprocity and reputation affects an individual’s 
judgment of their fellow people in small scale collective action (SSCA). In LSCA, however, 
where faces change, and direct reciprocity is infeasible additional information, a heuristic, is 
needed to foster cooperation i.e. a reputable name (Mishina et al, 2012, Milinski, 2016). When 
dealing with individuals’ evaluation of e.g. corporations, organizations or the state it is 
important to keep in mind that organizational reputation is not to be confused with its 
conceptual cousin legitimacy. It is true that both concepts share some of the same antecedents 
e.g. organizational size and charitable giving.  
What distinguishes the two concepts is by what aspects they are evaluated by individuals. 
Simply put, legitimacy is evaluated in relation to similarity while reputation is evaluated in 
relation to differences (Bitektine, 2011: 160). In line with this claim legitimacy is considered to 
be evaluated in relation to social acceptance, i.e. how well an organization live up to normative, 
regulative norms and expectations. Reputation is also evaluated in relation to how well 
organizations live up to these same norms and expectation, as well as other attributes, but in 
relation to how other organizations perform (Deephouse & Carter, 2005, Bitektine, 2011). 
Additionally, there is an economic logic to reputation. Evaluating an organization’s past 
behavior, in relation to e.g. reciprocity, creates expectations of how that organization will 
behave in the future. It is an indication of what the organization is capable of, and how it will 
likely behave in a similar situation. As reputation levels are used a heuristic for determining 
future behavior it is important to note that they are vulnerable to new information about past 
behavior. Negative effects on reputation levels may cause stakeholder, e.g. members, to defect. 
A good reputation is therefore paramount for e.g. environmental organizations, corporations 
and NGO’s (Lange et al, 2011, Bitektine, 2011, Mishina et al, 2012). 
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Bitektine (2011) analyzes how individuals make judgments of social organizations regarding, 
legitimacy, reputation and status. The evaluator will analyze the past behavior of the 
organization in relation to other organizations e.g. its honesty, quality of product, if it is a viable 
competitor and if it is well-managed. This information is then used as a predictor of how the 
organization can potentially behave in the future (Bitektine, 2011). If no information can be 
found on a specific organization, it will most likely be treated as reputation neutral (RN) by the 
evaluator. If for example an individual wants to join an environmental organization, they will 
join an organization judged to have a positive reputation (RP) in the first hand, if one cannot be 
found an RN organization will be chosen. The author hypothesizes that, if an RN or RP 
organization cannot be found the individual will join an organization with bad reputation (RB) 
(Bitektine, 2011: 165-166). Considering the detrimental effects, a bad reputation has for 
cooperation between individuals, I believe an individual would be hard-pressed to join or 
actively support an organization with a bad reputation if they have a choice of abstaining from 
participation altogether.  
2.5. Hypotheses 
This thesis aims to explore the differences in engaging in costly proenvironmental behavior, 
conceptualized as membership in an environmental organization, and how an individuals’ 
evaluation of an organization’s reputation affects the relationship. The main focus is to assess 
this relationship in relation to the hierarchical model of the VBN theory, as presented above in 
the theory section. Based on the previous research the first hypothesis pertains to the personal 
characteristics explained in the VBN theory and the hierarchical nature of the VBN theory 
(Stern et al, 1999, Stern, 2000, Nordlund & Garvill, 2005, Harring & Jagers, 2013). That is, 
individuals with altruistic values, proenvironmental beliefs and strong personal norms of 
behavior, will be more inclined to join environmental organizations. Additionally, the second 
hypothesis relates to the hierchical nature of the VBN theory. Since it is hierarchical personal 
norms are considered to mediate the effects of the antecedent factors in the model i.e. an 
individual’s personal norm of proenvironmental behavior mediates the effects of that 
individual’s values and beliefs. Thus, the first two hypotheses that will be tested are formulated 
as follows: 
H₁ In accordance with the VBN theory, individuals with a stronger personal norm for 
proenvironmental behavior will be more likely to join environmental organizations 
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However, since membership is characterized as a costly behavior in previous research, the 
relationship hypothesized in H₁ is expected to be rather weak albeit positive. The relationship 
is expected to strengthen with the introduction of reputation to the model. As shown in previous 
research, reputation has been shown to facilitate cooperation in both smaller and larger groups 
through indirect reciprocity. Additionally, reputation has also been shown to carry over from 
one’s own social group to other social groups. Through evaluations of an individual’s or an 
organization’s past conduct people assess their probable future behavior (Milinski, 2016, 
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). In relation to LSCA, reputation is used a heuristic to assess how 
well e.g. an environmental organization performs in relation to other organization along certain 
attributes e.g. altruism.  Individuals using reputation as a heuristic to evaluate an organization’s 
past behavior and to gauge probable future behavior will thus be more or less inclined to become 
a member, based on the level of confidence the reputation inspires (Deephouse & Carter, 2005, 
Bitektine, 2011). Hence the second hypothesis to be tested in this thesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H₂  The higher the reputation of an environmental organization, the more likely an individual 
is to become a member  
Furthermore, since reputation is seen by individuals as something normatively desirable 
because it enhances people’s willingness to cooperate with them within and outside of their 
social group, a hypothesis considering egoistic motivations for becoming a member should be 
included in the study. Egoistic motivations could include wanting to be recognized, or 
maximizing one’s reputation. If others in an individuals social group notice that they are 
members of an environmental organization with a good reputation this may send signals that 
the individual is worthy of cooperation, therefore making membership in an organization 
desirable to an individual with egoistic motivations. This, despite potentially not having as 
strong pro-environmental values and beliefs. Hence the third and final hypothesis to be included 
in the analysis is formulated as follows: 
H₃ An individual with self-enhancement values will be as likely as, or more likely than, an 
individual with altruistic traits to become a member in an environmental organization 
3. Method 
This section of the thesis will discuss and describe the data that was chosen for the analysis. 
Additionally, the potential problems and advantages of using this kind of data is discussed. 
Furthermore, the section will also problematize and discuss the operationalization of the 
18 
 
concepts that are to be tested in the analysis. Finally, a description of the chosen method of 
statistical analysis is presented and discussed. 
3.1. Data 
For this thesis the World Values Survey (WVS) dataset has been chosen for the analysis. The 
WVS is the largest non-commercial and cross-national investigation into the values and beliefs 
of the general public that has ever been conducted. The data is widely accessible and is 
frequently used by scientist. The individual data has not been aggregated. Since its conception 
in 1981, the investigation has been conducted in a number of waves, with the most recent being 
wave six in 2010 to 2014. The data is collected nationally, and the respondents are sampled 
randomly from the population. Additionally, even though the data is collected by scientists in 
the individual nations, only one standardized survey is used in all countries, thus ensuring 
comparability along respondents from the different countries. Data is collected on everything 
from socio-demographic variables e.g. income, age, religion, to whether an individual would 
be willing to go to war for her country (WVS, 2018). In this thesis the fifth wave, conducted in 
2005-2008 in 58 countries and gathering 83,795 respondents, was chosen for further analysis. 
After applying a filter, removing all respondents who had not answered all of the variables 
included in the analysis, 44314 respondents from 47 countries remained. The reason for not 
choosing the most recent one is simple; the latest wave has much fewer variables pertaining to 
climate change and other environmental issues.  
For a thesis on the VBN theory the WVS is by no means the best data set available. The 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), for example, has a much more comprehensive 
set of variables in relation to Schwartz universal values, NEP and the remaining variables. 
However, after scouring every dataset that came to mind, e.g. the European Social Survey 
(ESS), ISSP and the EVS, it became clear that the WVS was the only dataset that included a 
question on respondents’ evaluation of the reputation of the environmental movements. As a 
result of this choice, this thesis loses the ability to operationalize most of the key concepts in 
the same way as previous research has done. Consequently, this thesis becomes more tentative 
and heuristic in nature. Instead of adding directly to the cumulative nature of earlier research 
on proenvironmental behavior, this thesis explores the potential of the proposed relationship. If 
the thesis should find support for its hypotheses, it will be a sign that further research, using 
standard operationalizations, is warranted. Therefore, the author feels confident in moving 
forward with the analysis, despite flawed operationalizations. For a full account of which 
variables were used in the operationalizations, i.e. wording and answer categories, see appendix 
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1. All variables were recoded to filter out all missing categories, and if needed they were 
reversed so that all response options go in the same direction.  
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable in this thesis is whether or not the respondent is a member in an 
environmental organization. Being a member in a social movement or organization has been 
categorized as a costly action by previous literature (see e.g. Stern et al, 1999). The variable 
originally had three response option; 0: not a member, 1: passive member, 2: active member. 
However, since this study is quite tentative in its nature, it was decided that intensity of 
membership was not as interesting as membership overall. Membership, whether active or 
passive, still represent a costly behavior, albeit of different intensity. Having two categories that 
denote membership, could potentially dilute the effect of the predictors, and make it harder to 
discern the effect of reputation. Therefore, in the hope that two categories would bring clearer 
answers in relation to the effect of reputation, the variable was recoded into two response 
options; 1: Not a member, 2: Member.  
3.1.2. Independent variables 
Reputation is the key variable for this thesis and is measured by a question asking for the 
respondents’ confidence in the environmental movement. The question has four response 
options, that were reverse coded to make theoretical sense: 1: None at all, 2: Not very much, 3: 
Quite a lot, 4: A great deal. The fact that the question deals with the environmental movement 
and not environmental organizations, or for that matter a specific environmental organization, 
could potentially be an issue. However, as environmental organizations are part of the 
environmental movement, one can presume that the level of confidence in the movement can 
be transferred to, specific or as a whole, organizations as well. Confidence can be seen as a 
plausible proxy for reputation since it suggests that the respondents reflect on the historical 
performance of the environmental movement and how it will likely perform in the future (Lange 
et al, 2005, Bitektine, 2011).   
Following the example of Harring and Jagers (2013) and Steg and colleagues (2005), in order 
to measure peoples’ personal values I have used a condensed version of Schwartz’s (1992) 
universal values scale. With the variables provided by WVS two value sets could be included 
in the analysis, self-enhancement and self-transcendence i.e. egoism and altruism. Egoism and 
altruism were measured with 10 items, five measuring self-enhancement and five measuring 
self-transcendence, asking the respondent to answer if a described person was similar to them. 
The response options were: 1: Very much like me, 2: Like me, 3: Somewhat like me 4: A little 
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like me, 5: Not like me, 6: Not at all like me. The respective five items were turned into scales, 
denoting altruism and egoism. The altruism scale hade a Cronbach’s alpha of 0,713 and the 
egoism scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0,672. Ideally, the Cronbach’s alpha value should be 
over 0,7, however 0,672 is close enough to 0,7 that it does not seem necessary to exclude the 
scale from the analysis. Additionally, using scales with values below 0,7 has been done in the 
previous literature (see e.g. Harring & Jagers, 2013).  
NEP has by the previous literature been defined as the growing realization that one’s action has 
profound and far-reaching effects on the global environment (Stern et al, 1999, Stern, 2000, 
Dunlap et al, 2000). It is usually investigated through a 15-item battery of variables, in which 
respondents give share their views on e.g. the state of the global environment, whether science 
is good for the environment or not and if humans have the right to exploit the planet or if nature 
has a right to exist without human interference (Dunlap et al, 2000). Though there are examples 
where scientists use a condensed 10-item scale instead (Harring & Jagers, 2013). However, 
since the WVS do not offer the 15-item scale or the condensed 10-item scale, this thesis has 
operationalized NEP using three items that asks respondents about their opinion on the state of 
the global environment. The response options for the three items were: 1: Very serious, 2: 
Somewhat serious, 3: Not very serious, 4: Not serious at all. The items were coded into a scale 
that had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0,811. Even though it is not as comprehensive as the 15- or 10- 
item operationalizations, the main point of the growing realization of effects on the global 
environment still stands. The operationalization in this thesis mainly taps in to one dimension 
of NEP, i.e. the state of the global environment.  
AC, similar to NEP, is hard to capture in the usual way using WVS data. In the previous 
literature it has been measured through asking questions about if the respondents consider 
environmental problems will be a serious issue to them and their social context or whether 
climate change problems have been exaggerated (Stern et al, 1999, Harring & Jagers, 2013). In 
this thesis it is measured using three questions asking the respondents how serious they deem 
environmental problems in their community. This does not capture AC as well as it has been 
operationalized in previous literature, but it still invokes thought on how serious the issue of 
environmental degradation is, in the respondents. Knowing how serious, or thinking they know, 
environmental problems are in their community indicates a certain awareness of consequences. 
Thus, the three items were deemed sufficient to include in the analysis. The three items that 
were used had four response options; 1: Very serious, 2: Somewhat serious, 3: Not very serious, 
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4: Not serious at all. Furthermore, they were turned into a scale that had a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0,899.  
When it comes to measuring AR, there were no variables that are usually included in the 
operationalizations. Traditionally, AR is measured through asking the respondents if they feel 
personally, or jointly, responsible for different environmental problems or if they feel that their 
contribution to the problem at hand is insignificant in the larger scheme (Steg et al, 2005, 
Harring & Jagers, 2013). In this thesis it is measured through using a standard survey question 
on whether, if the choice is presented, the respondent would rather prioritize economic growth 
and the creation of job opportunities or if they would rather prioritize environmental protection. 
This is answered on two response options; 1: Protecting the environment, 2: Economic growth. 
This, arguably, does not capture the dimension of ascription of responsibility to oneself as fully 
as the items suggested by previous literature. However, it can be argued that if an individual is 
prone to prioritizing environmental protection over the creation of jobs and economic growth, 
the same individual has ascribed responsibility for the health of the environment to him- or 
herself. As such, it will be used as a proxy for AR in this thesis.  
In order to operationalize personal norm previous literature asks the respondents questions 
concerning the if the person feels guilty if not acting proenvironmentally and feel morally or 
personally obligated to behave in a certain proenvironmental way (Harring & Jagers, 2013, Steg 
et al, 2005). In this study the two questions used to measure personal norm concern if the 
respondents would be willing to sacrifice part of their income to prevent environmental 
pollution or if they would be willing to pay higher taxes if they knew that the money went to 
battling environmental pollution. This is potentially problematic since it does not tap into the 
moral dimension of the personal norm, but rather the willingness to pay which in itself, is a 
behavior that is usually included as an outcome in studies aimed at predicting proenvironmental 
behavior. However as shown by the previous literature, questions used to measure personal 
norm include those on the personal feeling of obligation to behave proenvironmentally (Steg et 
al, 2005: 419). The willingness to sacrifice part of one’s pay or paying higher taxes could, albeit 
with difficulty, be argued to signify a personal obligation to behave in proenvironmentally. 
Thus the two items were turned into a scale and included in the analysis. The scale received a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0,780. The two original items had 4 response options; 1: Strongly 
agree, 2: Agree, 3: Disagree, 4: Strongly disagree.    
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3.1.3. Control variables 
Since this thesis aims to study what in the previous literature has been called a costly behavior, 
it intuitively seems appropriate to include a control for income. The previous literature has 
established that what resources that an individual has greatly influences his or her capacity to 
act proenvironmentally (Harring & Jagers, 2013, Steg et al, 2005, Stern, 2000) In this study the 
question posed to ascertain income level asks the respondent which income decile of the country 
their household belong to considering all manner of p e.g. pensions, wages and other incomes. 
I chose to recode the variable so that there would three distinct categories i.e. one low income, 
one middle income and one high income. Below, in Table 1, descriptive statistics of my 
variables are presented. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. N 
Membership in 
Environmental 
organization 
1,13 ,339 1 2 44314 
Level of 
Reputation  
2,64 ,823 1 4 44314 
Altruistic 
Values  
22,94 4,345 5 30 44314 
Egoistic 
Values 
18,35 4,742 5 30 44314 
NEP 10,50 1,802 3 12 44314 
Awareness of 
Consequences 
8,82 3,093 3 12 44314 
Ascription of 
Responsibility  
1,57 ,494 1 2 44314 
Personal Norm 5,41 1,554 2 8 44314 
Income  1,82 ,626 1 3 44314 
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None of the variables included in this thesis are operationalized fully as the measures have been 
in previous literature. But since the WVS is the only dataset that I have found that includes the 
question used to operationalize reputation, it was decided this had to be tolerated. Nonetheless, 
in this thesis the aim is not to test the mediational power of the VBN theory, instead, the focus 
lies on the explanatory power of reputation and how this variable affects the explanatory power 
of the other measures and the model. Therefore, it was decided to move forward with the 
analysis of the proposed hypotheses. First, however, I will explain the chosen statistical method.  
3.2 Statistical method 
The statistical method chosen for this thesis is binary logistic regression. The reason for this is 
because my outcome variable is dichotomous. There are, generally speaking, two major 
traditions within quantitative analysis, one is to conduct logistic regressions and the other is to 
conduct ordinary least squares regressions (OLS). In OLS there is an assumption that there is a 
linear relationship between the variables in your analysis. However, this assumption requires 
that the variables included are on a continuous level. Therefore, since my dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I cannot have a linear assumption in my analysis. The linear assumption further 
creates the possibility in the analysis to predict the value of the outcome variable based on the 
value on the predictor. Logistic regression casts the linear assumption aside, and instead of 
focusing on predicting the value of the outcome variable, it aims to predict the probability of 
an event occurring in relation to your outcome variable (Field, 2013). In the case of my analysis, 
logistic regression will, through calculation of the known values on my independent variables, 
predict the probability of someone being a member in an environmental organization or not.  
Additionally, the interpretation of the output differs in logistic regression from that of OLS. In 
OLS one interprets the B-coefficient as an effect change in the value of the outcome variable, 
i.e. a one step increase in the predictor indicates an increase in the outcome variable 
corresponding to the value of the B-coefficient.  In logistic regression the only things of interest 
in the B-coefficient is the sign, positive or negative, and the statistical significance value. What 
is of particular interest in a logistic regression is the odds ratio. The odds ratio illustrates the 
effect size of your predictors and is calculated by using the exponential value of the B-
coefficient. For example, the odds ratio demonstrates the change in the odds, from a one step 
increase in the predictors, of a respondent being a member or not. The odds ratio can be fairly 
hard to interpret. There is, however, a general rule of thumb to help with this. If the value of the 
odds ratio is greater than 1 it means that the odds of an even occurring becomes greater as the 
predictor’s value increases, and vice versa, if the value of the odds ratio is below 1 it means that 
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the odds of the event occurring decreases as the predictors value increases (Field, 2013: 762, 
767). Finally, the last part of the output that is important to interpret concerns the fit of the 
model and explained variance. In OLS the R-squared is used to interpret how much of the 
variance is explained by the model, and how good the fit of the model is. In logistic regression 
a Pseudo-R measure is used instead, namely; Nagelkerkes R2. Both R-squared and Nagelkerkes 
R2 measure the substantive significance of your model, and also how much of the variance in 
the phenomena that is explained by your model (Field, 2013: 764-767). 
3.3. Limitations of the research 
The choice of conducting a cross-sectional logistic regression analysis to investigate the effect 
of reputation on proenvironmental behavior, is not an obvious one. Given that my variables are 
somewhat lacking in their operationalizations as well, questions concerning whether or not this 
thesis should have utilized other methodological techniques are warranted. In previous literature 
concerning reputation experimental studiers are highly predominant. This would have been a 
good way to conduct my study as well. In an experimental study it is possible to test the effect 
of different stimuli on the outcome variable within a, relatively, controlled context. 
Experimental studies also make it easier to draw conclusions regarding causality (Esaiasson et 
al, 2012). In the case of this study a survey experiment could have been performed, in which 
the respondents would have answered questions on values, beliefs and norms. Furthermore, 
they would have been subjected to a stimuli in which the variable reputation would have been 
manipulated to see how this subsequently affected the outcome variable, membership in an 
organization. Additionally, in the case of an experimental study, the dependent variable could 
have been specified to designate membership in a specific organization which would have made 
it easier to draw conclusions regarding the effect of reputation.  
However, experimental studies raise questions of ethical concerns. The manipulation of 
respondents for the simple reason of academic research is something that should not be taken 
lightly. Furthermore, to test whether a low or high reputation garners more or less members, 
would entail experimenting with organizations’ reputation levels, albeit hypothetically through 
e.g. fake news articles or reports. This too should not be done lightly, since it is nigh on 
impossible to know whether the stimuli continue to affect respondents after the research is done. 
Moreover, since this study is highly tentative, and is aiming to explain a certain relationship for 
the first time, there is reason to be careful in research design as well. If this thesis should find 
evidence of the relationship, subsequent future research should put more time and effort into 
conducting experimental studies and quantitative analyses.  
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4. Results 
In this section the empirical results will be presented. In Table 2 the results for all of my models 
are presented. In Model 1 the focus is on the first hypothesis (H1), which states that it is 
expected that a strong personal norm should lead to a higher probability of membership in an 
organization. In model 2, the second (H2) and third (H3) hypothesis is tested, which means that 
its expected that individuals who accord a higher reputation to the environmental movement 
will be more likely to be members than individuals who hold the environmental movement in 
lesser regard. Furthermore, in line with hypothesis 3, in this model it is also expected that 
individuals who have more egoistic value sets will be as likely or more likely than altruistic 
individuals to be members in an environmental organization. In the third model, I have included 
my control variable income, to see how this affects my relationships. I will present the results 
and analyze how they relate to my hypotheses in chronological order, starting with model 1, 
then model 2 and so forth. Before I start however, it is worth mentioning that my dependent 
variable was automatically recoded when entered into the regression. Being a member is now 
coded as 1 instead of 2, and not being a member is now coded as 0 instead of 1.  
4.1. Model 1 
In model 1, the VBN model is tested to see how it affects the outcome variable; membership in 
an environmental organization. H1 states that we should expect that a stronger personal norm 
leads to a higher probability of the respondent being a member. The Nagelkerke R2 value is 
0,046, which tells us that the model explains very little of the phenomenon. All the variables 
included in the model are statistically significant on the highest level (0,000), except for 
Altruism which is not significant at all. Altruism will therefore be excluded from further 
analysis in relation to model 1.   
All other variables behave as expected, except for Egoism that surprisingly show a positive b-
coefficient (0,050) without the influence of reputation. Which indicates that self-enhancement 
values may lead to a higher degree of membership in environmental organization. The odds 
ratio value for egoism, however, is only 1,052 which, while positive, indicates very small odds 
of membership. Additionally, NEP surprisingly shows a statistically significant, negative value 
of -0,091 and an odds ratio of 0,931, indicating that as individuals become more aware of the 
state of the global environmental degradation and the far-reaching effects of their behavior, the 
less likely they are to join an environmental organization. AC, however behaves as expected, 
showing a positive value on the b-coefficient, 0,33 and an odds ratio of 1,034, indicating that 
as AC increases, as does membership in organizations. 
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Table 2 – Logistic Regression Analysis. The effects of Reputation on the VBN-model and 
membership in environmental organizations.  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B-coeff. Odds 
ratio 
B-coeff. Odds 
ratio 
B-coeff. Odds 
ratio 
Altruism  
-,001 
(,004) 
,999 
-,008* 
(,004) 
,992 
-,004 
(,004) 
,996 
Egoism 
,050*** 
(,003) 
1,052 
,047*** 
(,003) 
1,049 
,045*** 
(,003) 
1,046 
NEP 
-,091*** 
(,008) 
,913 
-,104*** 
(,008) 
,901 
-,106*** 
(,008) 
,899 
Awareness of 
Consequences  
,033*** 
(,005) 
1,034 
,038*** 
(,005) 
1,039 
,042*** 
(,005) 
1,043 
Ascription of 
Responsibility  
(Ref. category – 
Economic growth) 
      
Ascription of 
Responsibility 
(Environmental 
Protection) 
,180*** 
(,030) 
1,197 
,144*** 
(,030) 
1,154 
,139*** 
(,030) 
1,149 
Personal Norm 
,227*** 
(,010) 
1,255 
,203*** 
(,010) 
1,225 
,199*** 
(,010) 
1,220 
Reputation    
,318*** 
(,018) 
1,374 
,317*** 
(,018) 
1,372 
Income 
(Ref. catgory – low 
income) 
      
Income - Medium     
,187*** 
(,034) 
1,206 
Income - High     
,397*** 
(,047) 
1,488 
Constant 
-3,528 -3,949 -4,253 
Nagelkerke 2 
,046 ,058 ,061 
N 
44314 44314 44314 
Comment: Dependent variable: Membership in Environmental Organization (Values 0-not a member, 1- 
member). Models estimated using logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. Significant levels 
at: *** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05. Values express B-coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. 
See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: WVS Data Wave 5 – 2005-2009 
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Since AR was operationalized using a dichotomous variable I had to include it in the analysis 
as a dummy variable. For this analysis it means that instead of being analyzed in relation to the 
other variables in the regression, this variable is instead compared to itself. For this analysis 
this means that those who answered that they would prioritize environmental protection are 
analyzed in relation to the ones who answered they would prioritize economic growth and 
creating job opportunities. Thus, we can state that people who prioritize environmental 
protection are more like to be members in environmental organizations. The variable shows a 
significant, positive value on the b-coefficient, 0,180 and a relatively high odds ratio value of 
1,149. In line with hypothesis 1, a higher strength of personal norm indicates a higher 
probability of being a member in an environmental organization. The b-coefficient shows a 
positive value, and the odds ratio is 1,255, indicating that of all the variables in model 1, 
personal norm has the strongest probability of leading to membership. In order to better 
visualize the relationship between personal norms and membership in an environmental 
organization, the predictive probabilities has been plotted below. There we can clearly see that 
the stronger the personal norm, the higher the probability of membership, which validates H1. 
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4.2. Model 2 
In Model 2 both H2 and H3 are tested. Thus, it is expected that respondents who accord a higher 
reputation to the environmental movement will be to a higher extent be members of an 
environmental organization. Furthermore, it is expected that respondents who exhibit more 
egoistic values to be as likely as, or more likely, to be members in environmental organizations. 
First off, we can see that the Nagelkerke R2 has increased to 0,058, which indicates that the 
model explains more of the variance in the phenomenon. It is still a very low value, but since it 
increases, it suggests that including reputation made the model fit a little better.  
Moreover, in this model Altruism has gained a statistically significant value, albeit on the lowest 
level. It is still a negative value, -0,008, with an odds ratio of 0,992. Which, counter to the 
previous literature that claim that traditional “self-transcendent” values promote 
proenvironmental behavior, indicates that as an individual becomes more altruistic the less 
inclined he or she is to become a member in an environmental organization. The same goes for 
NEP, which values also decrease (0,901). Egoism retains its positive value, albeit with a small 
decrease, on the b-coefficient, 0,047, and its odds ratio, 1,049. This is in line with H3, that 
respondents that exhibit more egoistic values will be as likely as, or more likely than, 
individuals exhibiting altruistic values, to be members in an environmental organization. 
Reputation has the largest effect size with a positive sign on the b-coefficient, 0,318, and an 
odds ratio of 1,374. The small decrease in the odds ratio, of egoism, can be explained by the 
introduction of reputation to the model. Some of the effect of egoism is now mediated through 
the effect of reputation. The same can be said for the decreases in AR and PN, (1,154 and 
1,225). Interestingly, AC’s odds ratio increases (1,039), suggesting that when reputation is 
included in the model, AC becomes more important for membership in an environmental 
behavior. So far the results in this model show support for both H2 and H3. Reputation has a 
highly positive effect on membership in environmental organizations, and also seems to 
mediate some effect from other variables in the model. In order to visualize the relationship 
between reputation and membership in an environmental organization, as well as that between 
altruism, and egoism, membership, the predicted probabilities have been plotted below.   
The plots clearly show support for both H2 and H3. In line with H2 there is a much higher 
probability for respondents who have a higher opinion of environmental organization to 
subsequently be members. In line with H3 there is a higher probability that people with egoistic 
values are members of environmental organizations than altruistic respondents.  
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The fact that in the model, some of the effect of egoism seems to be mediated through reputation 
suggests that other motivations than proenvironmental motivations lie at the root of 
proenvironmental behavior. Since egoism lies before AC in the mediational model of VBN, the 
rise in AC suggests that some of the effect of egoism is mediated through AC as well. Moreover, 
AC in this thesis has been operationalized as awareness of consequences of environmental 
degradation in the respondents’ communities. This suggests that egoistic individuals motivate 
joining environmental organizations based on knowledge of the current state of environmental 
degradation in the communities. This in turn proposes that other motivations than 
proenvironmental motivations, e.g. motivations concerning health or economical motivations, 
are the drivers of membership in environmental organizations.  
4.3. Model 3 
In Model 3 I included my control variable; Income. Since the aim of the paper is to investigate 
a costly behavior I would have been remiss if I had not included a variable on income. In the 
previous literature personal resources has been shown to effect individuals’ capacity to act 
proenvironmentally, this should be even more true when it comes to costly behavior. Since my 
income variable was categorical, the regression turned it into a dummy variable. Thus, it will 
be interpreted in the same way as AR. The reference category is the low-income group. The 
first thing to note is that the Nagelkerke R2 has increased to 0,061, again indicating that the 
model fit has become better, and that including the income variable explains more of the 
variance in the phenomenon. Additionally, Altruism once again loses statistical significance, 
and will thus not be further analyzed in relation to this model.  
Egoism, PN and Reputation experience miniscule decreases when income is included in the 
model. This suggests that income levels mediate some of the effect of these variables. The only 
previous variable that increases its effect size is AC (1,043). The fact that almost all variables 
experience a decrease in their odds ratio when income is included in the model, lends credence 
to the previous literature’s claim that income affects individuals’ capacity to act 
proenvironmentally. In relation to the low-income group, both the medium-income and the 
high-income show higher probability of membership in an environmental organization (1,206 
and 1,408 respectively). I have included a plot of the predicted probabilities of the effect of 
income on membership in environmental organizations below.  
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The plot shows that the probability of membership in an environmental organization clearly 
rises as income levels become higher. This proposes that income levels provide capacity and 
resources for individuals to become members in environmental organizations. The previous 
literature states that costly behavior is costly not only in money, but also in e.g. time and effort. 
The income variable only captures the monetary dimension, but this entices further research 
into other dimensions of resources in relation to costly behavior.  
To summarize, there is a strong statistically significant relationship between my proposed 
predictors and membership in an environmental organization. It was found that PN has a weak 
but statistically significant relationship to membership in an environmental organization. 
Additionally, respondents who accorded the environmental movement with a high reputation 
were found to be more likely to become members of environmental organization. Moreover, 
Egoistic individuals were found to be more likely than Altruistic individuals to become 
members of environmental organizations. Thus H1, H2 and H3 were all supported. Taken 
together this shows that there is a strong statistically significant relationship between reputation 
and costly proenvironmental behavior. However, it should be noted that the Nagelkerke R2 is 
very low throughout the models, even though it increased by quite a large margin, indicating 
that my proposed variables explain very little of the variance in the phenomenon.  
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5. Concluding discussion 
This thesis found its point of departure in the conundrum of why people join environmental 
organizations. Environmental organizations work to influence policy-makers and channel 
public opinion in order to promote collective action. To find what factors can predict 
membership in environmental organizations is becoming increasingly important as climate 
change worsens, and collective action seems out of reach. In LSCA, cooperation becomes even 
harder to ensure than in SSCA, due to the fact that accountability is harder to ensure. The VBN 
theory argues that when individuals harbor the right values, beliefs and norms, 
proenvironmental behavior will ensue and thus alleviate the collective action problems. To 
some extent, this has been shown to be the case.  
However, The VBN theory has struggled with explaining costlier proenvironmental behavior, 
of which membership in an environmental organization is one. There have been efforts to 
expand the theory to be able to predict costly behaviors as well. Through mechanisms of e.g. 
interpersonal and political trust (Harring & Jagers, 2013) authors have been able to explain 
more environmental behaviors, but the theory still lacks explanatory power. Reputation has 
long been seen as a facilitator of cooperator in small scale collective action. But there are 
arguments that it should work in similar way in LSCA as well. Therefore, the overarching aim 
for this thesis was to investigate the role of reputation in the VBN theory, to see if this could 
account for a specific costly behavior i.e. membership in an environmental organization and 
thereby add to the literature. By merging two literatures, VBN theory and Reputation, the thesis 
aimed to add to the literature by examining what has caused the gap between environmental 
concern and proenvironmental behavior i.e. that some individuals express concern, and harbor 
all the right values, beliefs and norms, but still do not engage in costly proenvironmental 
behavior. Furthermore, this thesis aimed to add to the literature by studying a specific behavior 
rather than aggregated measure of many behaviors. As such, this thesis postulated three 
hypotheses in relation to the VBN theory, reputation and membership in environmental 
organizations. First it was hypothesized that a stronger personal norm would lead to higher 
levels of membership in environmental organizations (H1).  Although it was expected this 
relationship would be rather weak. Secondly, that higher levels of reputation would lead to 
higher levels of membership (H2). And thirdly that egoistic respondents would be as likely as, 
or more likely than, altruistic individuals to join environmental organizations (H3).  
In the results, through quantitative analysis and deploying logistic regression, the thesis found 
support for the hypothesis that a stronger personal norm would lead to higher levels of 
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organizational membership. While it was rather weak, it showed that the VBN theory is on the 
right track. This relationship was expected to be strengthened in the next model where 
reputation was included. Instead it was found that reputation mediated some of the effect of 
personal norm. In the second model the thesis found support for H2, i.e. it showed that people 
who deemed the environmental movements as of high reputation, were more likely to become 
members. In this model the thesis also found support for H3, namely that egoistic individuals 
seem to be more likely to join environmental organizations. The effect of egoism was mediated 
through AC, operationalized as awareness of environmental degradation in the respondents’ 
communities, and reputation.  
This suggests that egoistic individuals have other motivations for acting proenvironmentally 
than proenvironmentalism as is proposed by (Jagers et al, 2016). Since AC was operationalized 
using items dealing with local environmental degradation, it further suggests that these 
motivations might be economical or health related. Poor air or water quality potentially brings 
expensive costs for the respondents. This also begs the question that since AC was the only 
variable that consistently increased its odds ratio value, maybe the dependent variable was 
judged on a local dimension as well. It makes logical sense that egoistic respondents would be 
more willing to join an environmental organization if the organization targets local issues if the 
motivations are economical or health related. This is not something I tested for, but it is 
something that future research should focus on. Testing this relationship, while also taking into 
account different motivations could prove fruitful. Furthermore, future research should 
disaggregate the “environmental movement” and focus on differences in reputation and aim of 
national and local organizations, big and small, while simultaneously testing for different 
motivations. Furthermore, this thesis tested if income had an effect on membership. The 
assumption was made that higher levels of income should lead to higher levels of membership. 
This was supported, while it did not affect the other variables more than marginally. Income 
does have an independent and separate effect in relation to most variables in the model. 
However, it should be noted that, the variables I used to operationalize my concepts were not 
optimal. I deviated substantially from the procedures and operationalizations used in the 
previous literature. The reason behind choosing the WVS to study the relationship is because it 
was the only survey I found that included a question on the reputation of environmental 
organizations. While my operationalizations are not optimal, they all capture at least part of the 
dimensions proposed by the previous literature. This is to be viewed as a tentative theory-
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developing study, the intended effect of one such is to show that there is merit in the proposed 
relationship, and that it therefore should be of interest for future research.  
Since this thesis found support for all of its hypotheses, I feel reasonably assured that reputation 
does provide some answers in regard to costly proenvironmental behavior. Part of the research 
gap in explaining costly proenvironmental behaviors has been filled. And with this thesis a 
greater understanding for why and how people join environmental organizations has been 
achieved. However, since my operationalizations are flawed, this thesis should be viewed as a 
tentative test of the relationship, this phenomenon warrants further research in the future. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix 1. 
Membership in environmental organization 
(V29) Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you 
tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or don’t belong to that type of 
organization? 0: Not a member 1: Passive member 2: Active member. Was recoded so that no 
distinction was made between active or passive membership. New code 1: Don’t belong, 2: 
Member 
Reputation of environmental organization 
(V143) I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence or none at all? Environmental organizations 1: A great deal, 2: Quite 
a lot, 3: Not very much, 4: None at all. Was reverse code in order to for positive answers to 
have positive values. The original coding was replaced by; 1: None at all, 2: Not very much, 3: 
Quite a lot, 4: A great deal. 
Schwartz value sets 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each 
description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, 
or not at all like you? 1: Very much like me, 2: Like me, 3: Somewhat like me, 4: A little like 
me, 5: Not like me, 6: Not at all like me. Was reverse coded so that 1: Not at all like me and 6: 
Very much like me. The other response options were recoded accordingly. 
Altruism: (V82) Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything 
that might be dangerous. (V84) It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care 
for their well-being. (V87) It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid 
doing anything people would say is wrong. (V88) Looking after the environment is important to 
this person; to care for nature. (V89) Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs 
handed down by one’s religion or family. Variables were turned into a scale, Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0,713. Scale ranges from 5 to 30. 
Egoism: (V80) It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things 
one’s own way (V81) It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. (V83) It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself. 
(V85) Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s 
achievements. (V86) Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting 
life. Variables turned into a scale, Cronbach’s alpha was 0,672. Scale ranges from 5 to 30 
NEP 
Now let’s consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious 
you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat 
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serious, not very serious or not serious at all? 1: Very serious, 2: Somewhat serious, 3: Not very 
serious, 4: Not serious at all. Response options were reverse coded so that 1: Not serious at all, 
4, Very serious, and the others accordingly to make sense. 
(V111) Global warming or the greenhouse effect. (V112) Loss of plant or animal species or 
biodiversity (V113) Pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans. Variables turned into an index, 
Cronbach’s alpha 0,811. Scale ranges from 3 to 12. 
Awareness of consequences 
I am going to read out a list of environmental problems facing many communities. Please, tell 
me how serious you consider each one to be here in your own community. Is it very serious, 
somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all? 1: Very serious, 2: Somewhat serious, 
3: Not very serious, 4: Not serious at all. Response options were reverse coded so that 1: Not 
serious at all, 4, Very serious, and the others accordingly to make sense. 
(V108) Poor water quality (V109) Poor air quality (V110) Poor sewage and sanitation. 
Variables turned into an index, Cronbach’s alpha 0,899. Scale ranges from 3 to 12. 
Ascription of responsibility 
(V104) Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and 
economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? 1: Protecting the 
environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss 
of jobs. 2: Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment 
suffers to some extent. Was recoded so that the response options traded place with each other. 
In order for economic growth to be the ref category in the analysis.  
Personal norm 
I am going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one, can you tell me 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? 1: Strongly agree, 2: Agree, 
3: Disagree, 4: Strongly disagree. The response options were reverse coded so that 1: Strongly 
disagree and 4: Strongly agree. The others were recoded accordingly. 
(V105) I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution. (V106) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were 
used to prevent environmental pollution.  
Income 
On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the 
“highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your household 
is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other 
incomes that come in. 1: Lowest decile to 10 – Highest Decile. Was recoded into 3 categories, 
values 1-3 became 1, values 4-7 became 2, and values 8-10 became 3. 
 
 
